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1. Introduction  
 
The study of international relations is concerned, explicitly and implicitly, with the category 
of space. The geographic space, its perceptions and representations, provide a fundamental 
and intriguing conceptual framework for understanding and analyzing international relations. 
Yet as the political scientist Harvey Starr suggested in his 2013 ISA presidential address, 
International Relations scholars ignore the notion of ‘space’, misinterpret it as deterministic, 
or dismiss it as irrelevant to their analysis.1 Starr’s proposal of taking the concept of ‘space’ 
more seriously applies also for historians of international thought: in this article I propose to 
trace back the role spatial categories, in particular geopolitics, played in shaping 1940s 
international thought. I will discuss two geopolitical theories to explore how interpretations 
of political space informed American ideas of postwar world order.  
In the early 1940s American international thinkers used spatial concepts to outline 
the postwar political map, and envisage the role of the United State in it. Geopolitics, which 
they understood as the dynamic, ever-changing interaction between political government 
writ-large and natural geography, provided both research questions and interpretative tools. 
Since the approach to geopolitics that many promoted rejected the static, deterministic and 
immutable perception of geography, I suggest that the term ‘dynamic geopolitics’ describes 
well their ideas of reciprocal influence of the human and the natural spheres. Wartime 
geopoliticians would have shared Starr’s view that “geography affects changing perceptions 
of the possibilities and probabilities provided by the geographic environment.”2 Spatial 
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representations and geographical perceptions revolving around a dynamic and complex 
notion of geopolitics were gaining popularity among scholars of world politics. However, as 
will be shown, geopolitics failed to make a long-lasting conceptual contribution to political 
science, or define the research aims of the nascent discipline of International Relations (IR).3  
In what follows I return to two key figures in geopolitical thought, Owen Lattimore 
and Nicholas John Spykman, who contributed to shaping the pluralistic nature of 
international studies in the United States during the 1940s. Both identified in the war a 
unique potential for international change based on geopolitical relations. Taking as the 
starting point of my argument the assumption that implicit spatial representations in political 
thought derive from concrete experiences of a given society, I explore the spatial 
representations in their theories. 4 The intellectual links between geopolitical thought and 
world order suggests that ideas about political space formed an indispensable part of 
theorizing international relations in the 1940s. Their notions of political space offered an 
alternative to legal conception of internationalism, and a new way of imagining pluralism and 
diversity in world politics, particularly in relation to imperialism and regionalism. 5  
                                                 
3
 The marginalization of geopolitics within international relations scholarship is evident in Starr’s call for its 
reintegration in the discipline’s conceptual toolbox: ‘It is important to stress that despite living 
in the interdependent, transnational, and globalized world of the twenty-first century, geographic factors such as 
territory and borders are still integral and meaningful elements of world politics.’ Ibid., 7. 
4
 Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and Global War (Minneapolis, 2010), 5. 
5
 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Martti Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (Helsinki, 1989); For an alternative account of the 
League of Nations and legal internationalism see Stephen Wertheim, ‘The League That Wasn’t: American Designs for a 
Legalist-Sanctionist League of Nations and the Intellectual Origins of International Organization, 1914–1920’, 
Diplomatic History 35 (2011), 797–836. 
 3 
However, as the decade drew to a close the geopolitical visions of international 
relations lost favor with academic scholars and the general public alike, and were eventually 
left out of the canon of International Relations (IR) scholarship.6 At the end of the war this 
was far from predictable. Both Spykman and Lattimore held key academic positions in 
international studies departments in the United States, contributed to discussion of 
international affairs in scholarly journals and mass-distribution newspapers, and were 
appreciated by colleagues and politicians alike. Lattimore (1900-1989) was an American 
sinologist, who grew up in China and made its culture, politics and languages his expertise.7 
Upon his return to the United States as a graduate student at Harvard College in 1928, he 
met with the prominent geographer Isaiah Bowman who became his academic patron.8 In 
1939, Bowman, then president of Johns Hopkins University, appointed Lattimore as the 
director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations. At the same time, 
Lattimore acted as editor of Pacific Affairs, the journal of the Institute of Pacific Relations. 
These institutional links allowed him to advance his interdisciplinary vision for the study of 
international relations in the United States. Lattimore’s expertise was appreciated by the 
political establishment. In 1942 US President F. D. Roosevelt appointed him as advisor to 
Chiang Kai-shek in China. By then he was considered the foremost American expert on the 
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Far East, and an ‘American geopolitical masterhand’.9 Lattimore’s controversially optimistic 
attitude towards Soviet Russia encouraged Senator Joseph McCarthy to accuse him, in 1951, 
of Soviet espionage. Lattimore’s biographer argued persuasively that these accusations were 
false, and indeed Lattimore was fully acquitted, yet his reputation suffered a severe blow and 
in 1963 he relocated to University of Leeds, UK, where he founded the Mongolian Studies 
program.  
Nicholas John Spykman (1893-1944) was born in the Netherlands, and travelled 
extensively in Asia and the Middle East before emigrating to the United States. He earned 
his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley.10 Later, with Arnold Wolfers and 
Frederick Sherwood Dunn he founded the Yale Institute of International Studies (YIIS) 
where he promoted an interdisciplinary approach to international relations with emphasis on 
geography and geopolitics.11 Spykman's two bestselling books on international relations, 
America’s Strategy in World Politics (1942) and The Geography of Peace (published posthumously in 
1944), won the praise of critics from academia and politics alike, including Isaiah Bowman. 12 
Later, Spykman was mentioned among the masterminds of Containment Policy, and 
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acknowledged as one of the founding fathers of the discipline of International Relations in 
America.13  
The focus on the dynamic qualities of geopolitics permitted Lattimore and Spykman 
to imagine a world based on pluralism and instability, rather than, as later thinkers 
characterized the postwar years, on order and division.14 They envisaged a tripolar 
international system led by three regional powers, one of which would be the United States. 
They attempted to account for and accommodate the rise of new powers like China and 
Russia within the postwar political and economic order by using geopolitical notions. In his 
geopolitical writings Lattimore is revealed not only as an influential sinologist, but also as a 
knowledgeable and original political thinker who based his international thought on concrete 
political and anthropological experience. Lattimore and Spykman exemplify the diversified, 
complex and interdisciplinary qualities of American scholarship on international relations in 
the 1940s. By importing concepts and methods from Anthropology, Area Studies, 
Economics, Geography and Geopolitics, they envisaged a more complex and inclusive 
approach to the study of the international realm than is usually accounted for. However, this 
pluralistic moment was short-lived.  
Lattimore and Spykman intended to make geopolitics the foundation of the nascent 
discipline of International Relations, but their project ended in failure. As I will argue, the 
marginalization of geopolitics within international studies was caused by changes in postwar 
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political space. After the war the key features of international relations became the 
American-Russian rivalry, human rights universalism, and postcolonial nationalism. 
Lattimore and Spykman were aware of these issues, and offered solutions based on regional 
political space. But postwar conception of space reconfigured in two dimensions, the 
universal and the state-centered, while the regional space lost political relevance. I will 
reconstruct the complexity of their 1940s geopolitical visions with two objectives in mind: to 
discover spatial conceptions that may offer new directions in International Relations, and to 
show that 1940s geopolitics failed because its interpretation of the postwar post-imperial 
political space overestimated the importance of regions while undermining the national and 
global dimensions.  
The article opens with a critical analysis of the development of American geopolitics 
in the first half of the twentieth century, followed by a contextualized assessment of the 
geopolitical world views of Spykman and Lattimore, through four key geopolitical concepts: 
‘Land, Sea and Air power’, ‘Scale’, ‘Frontier’ and ‘Tripolarity’. Furthermore, I examine their 
policy prescriptions for the Unites States, which were surprisingly similar despite their very 
different worldviews. Finally, I discuss the possible reasons for the marginalization of the 
global visions of Lattimore and Spykman within the nascent American discipline of 
International Relations.  
 
2. Geopolitics in Transition 
 
In their intellectual quest for new conceptual tools for the interpretation of international 
relations, many American scholars found inspiration in other disciplines, including, 
importantly, political geography and geopolitics. However, it is notable that American 
 7 
political geographers, or thinkers who applied geographic concepts to international relations, 
were very keen to distance themselves from the German school of Geopolitik, that in the 
American public imaginary was associated with the Nazi new world order of conquest and 
oppression.15 At the same time, it is clear that the exchange of geopolitical ideas between the 
two countries went back at least half a century, and was crucial to the development of 
geopolitical concepts. 
The interest in geopolitical ideas in the United States emerged at the turn of the 
century, when Fredrick Jackson Turner and Alfred Mahan explained the history and politics 
of the United States in geopolitical terms.16 Turner’s frontier theory and Mahan’s sea power 
vision became the cornerstones of later geopolitical thinking in America and Germany alike. 
Friedrick Ratzel’s famous notion of Lebensraum, the living space of the German people, was 
elaborated to counterbalance what Mahan described as American naval supremacy.17 Ratzel’s 
interpretation of politics in organic terms was introduced to an American readership by one 
of his students, Ellen Churchill Semple, who influenced greatly the younger generation of 
geographers, including Isaiah Bowman.18 At the same time, the relation between the physical 
environment and political power was also discussed by the British thinker Halford 
Mackinder, whose 1904 speech to the Royal Geographical Society warned his British 
                                                 
15
 Smith, American Empire, 274; Hans Werner Weigert, Generals and Geographers; the Twilight of Geopolitics (New 
York, 1942). 
16
 A. T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812 (London, 1905); Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in 
American History (New York, 1947). 
17
 Friedrich Ratzel, Anthropo-geographie (Stuttgart, 1882). 
18
 Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Mapping a New World: Geography and the Interwar Study of International Relations’, 
International Studies Quarterly 57 (2013), 138–149. 
 8 
audience of the risks that a land-based empire in the Russia could pose.19 He claimed that for 
the first time it was possible to reveal the ‘geographical causations of universal history’.20 His 
theory revolved around the historical notion of the ‘Heartland’, or geographical ‘Pivot’, a 
wide land mass stretching from the Balkans through Russia to the Arctic Sea. This was the 
geographic basis of the land power, which was opposed by a technologically-savvy and 
industrially-advanced sea power. His geopolitical thought sought to help Britain formulate a 
new geopolitical strategy in an interconnected closed system where competing imperial 
powers struggled to attain political and military supremacy.  
It was only over twenty years later that his idea of the ‘Heartland’ achieved greater 
international academic acclaim. In 1940s’ United States, Mackinder’s ideas set the terms for 
geopolitical debate. Gerry Kearns claims that Mackinder’s legacy was evident in three 
formulations of geopolitical theory: Nazi geopolitics of the 1930s, American Cold War 
Containment Policy and American unipolarism of the early 2000s.21 However, I argue that in 
the 1940s many American geopolitical thinkers found in Mackinder a provocative source of 
inspiration and used his thesis as the foundation for a new world order. Lattimore and 
Spykman were both influenced by Mackinder’s concept of the political space which oriented 
natural geography towards a concrete political end. Nevertheless, they rejected its 
fundamental spatial assumptions and attempted to elaborate more sophisticated and dynamic 
accounts of global geopolitics.   
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During the same period Mackinder also influenced, to his indignation, the German 
geographer Karl Haushofer who launched Geopolitik as a science and a national policy.22 
Haushofer’s geopolitics built on Mackinder’s theory, yet also recognized the importance of 
Bowman’s geographical survey The New World, first published in 1921 and revised in 1928.23 
Presented as a scientific study of the geographic conditions of various political units, the 
book promoted a new understanding of the relation between the natural and the human. As 
Smith suggests, in contrast to Bowman’s claims the book was not a neutral analysis: its 
implicit aim was to carve up a new geopolitical space for the United States, as a leader of a 
new economic and political system which recognized the limits of the state in an 
interconnected world.24 Bowman wrote the book after participating in the “Inquiry”, the 
American study group which informed the delegation to the Paris Conference in 1919. His 
book became an American bestseller, and copies were still distributed to US military libraries 
in the Second World War.25 In the interwar years Bowman actively promoted the study of 
Geography in the United States, and underpinned American political and moral 
exceptionalismin geopolitical terms, highlighting its unique mission as a global leader. By the 
mid-1940s he established a new Geography department at Johns Hopkins that wanted to be 
an ‘American Cambridge’, co-founded the Council for Foreign Relations and was the motor 
behind the International Geographical Union. He was a close advisor for President F. D. 
Roosevelt, and exerted significant influence on the State Department.26 As much as Bowman 
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wanted to distance his scholarship from the Geopolitik School, for many he was the 
‘American Haushofer’, an important link in the intellectual chain that connected Germany 
and the United States.27  
Haushofer saw Bowman’s magnum opus as a challenge: his reply was a geopolitical 
world vision based on German geopolitical interests. For him Geopolitik was a ‘science’ based 
on the concepts of Lebensraum, Land/Sea dichotomy, autarky and the idea of pan-
regionalism. In America his ideas were often presented, somewhat simplistically, as a 
‘pseudoscientific’ foundation for Hitler’s foreign policy.28 However, the geographer Robert 
Strausz-Hupé thought that the study of geopolitics in America was still intellectually 
worthwhile. In his book Geopolitics he surveyed German scholarship in order to offer his 
American readership a new way of studying international relations, a ‘radical break from the 
European legal tradition of 19th century diplomacy’.29 As he showed, the development of 
geopolitical thought was a result of the intense, yet often reluctant, relationship between 
German and American thinkers. For many Americans the Second World War brought this 
fruitful exchange to a crisis.  
Bowman, Lattimore, Mackinder, Strausz- Hupé and Weigert were part of a group of 
scholars sharing a keen interest in geopolitics. As a review article published in 1942 
suggested, they shared the theory of geopolitics that saw states as ‘dynamic phenomena’.30 
This focus on change, mutability and instability in the interaction between politics and 
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geography helped their geopolitical theories avoid the pitfalls of natural determinism. 
Geopolitics helped them conceptualize the main characteristic of states as, paradoxically, 
their instability, which resulted from the constant need to respond to natural, political and 
social challenges. Without recognizing their own ideological bias towards American 
exceptionalism, these geopoliticians argued theirs was a new – ‘scientific’ - version of 
Geopolitik in sharp contrast to Hitler’s expansionist ideology.31 The exchange of ideas 
between the German and American geopolitical schools culminated in the 1940s when 
American political geographers used geopolitical concepts like the Land/Sea dichotomy and 
the frontier to envisage a new global order, often unfolded in anti-imperial terms, in which 
the United States would have an active leading part.32 The group’s two collections of essays, 
entitled Compass of the World, manifest well the Americans intention to distinguish between 
the ‘science’ of Political Geography (which they professed to practice) and the ideologically-
biased German Geopolitik. Yet this distinction should be taken with a grain of salt, since 
many – but not all – American geopoliticians were motivated by a not less strong ideological 
drive to recast the United States as a leading actor in world affairs.33  
Despite not being directly associated with this American geopolitical circle, Spykman 
had a great influence on its members. In his review of Spykman’s The Geography of Peace, 
Weigert praised the author as a brilliant and original geopolitical thinker, while criticizing his 
basic assumptions which he claimed amounted to a ‘disillusioned submission to the old 
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balance of powers game’.34 Rejecting Spykman’s claim that Russia’s power concentrated in its 
western areas, and that China’s power lay in its coastal regions, Weigert considered his 
proposals reactionary and ‘outright dangerous’. By contrast to Spykman’s proposals, Weigert 
echoed Lattimore’s geopolitical interpretation and suggested that ‘a new age is dawning in 
Asia’, an age of local political development which would put an end to imperialism in the 
region. Weigert concluded his review by acknowledging Spykman’s influence on American 
geopolitics, whilst in the same breath accusing his last work of despair and nihilism. 
Weigert’s review emphasized explicitly the conceptual similarities between Lattimore and 
Spykman, who used the geopolitical lens to look at international order, yet at the same time 
pointed to the fundamental difference of their political and normative commitments.  
Lattimore used geopolitical ideas to articulate his analytical perspective on world 
politics and considered it a neutral, scientific tool of political analysis. At first sight, it seems 
that his geopolitical theory, centered on the land mass, was an interpretation of Mackinder’s 
Heartland. However, Lattimore had a different understanding of the relations between 
politics and geography, or in other words, of the meaning of Geopolitics as a social science. 
Geopolitics indicated an approach to analyzing political activity: ‘it is a “realist” 
understanding of a territory and the political powers that control it. It is a unique 
perspective, a way of studying a political unit, a region or a state, and its position in the 
world’.35 Lattimore gave a naïve, perhaps crude interpretation of geopolitics which was 
mainly aimed at distancing his own attempts at spatial theory from the ideological endeavors 
of the German geopoliticians. He claimed that the empirical reality, which could be observed 
by the senses and studied through intensive fieldwork, set the ground for political 
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theorization, and not vice versa. He argued that international relations had to be studied by 
rational analysis of the various aspects of human reality encountered in the field. 
Geographic, anthropological, linguistic and historical knowledge had to be taken into 
account when analyzing political relations. However, as will be shown, Lattimore’s historical 
narratives were motivated by a normative claim about the obsolescence of ‘empire’, which he 
hoped to replace by ‘democracy’. Both categories were defined in relation to space and 
political power: empires were ruled by repressive, external domination, while political power 
in democracies was internal, popular and participatory. His own work highlights that 
although geopolitics was often based on empirical knowledge of the world, it was never a 
value-free perspective.  
Spykman’s view of geopolitics was more similar to Mackinder’s, arguing that 
geopolitics provided the conceptual framework to take into consideration geographic factors 
when formulating a state’s foreign policy in peacetime or war.36 He recognized that 
geopolitics was necessarily oriented towards a political goal, and not just a neutral analytical 
perspective. Spykman’s geopolitical thought evolved from the preliminary argument that 
‘geography is the most fundamental factor in foreign policy of states because it is the most 
permanent’.37 Ó Tuathail has criticized this claim, arguing that natural conditions were in fact 
less permanent than Spykman wanted: geological shifts and climate change might impact a 
territory’s geographical conditions even in a short time span.38 Yet Spykman was not a 
geographical determinist. His fundamental claim was that a state’s specific geopolitical 
conditions and position in the world-system conditioned its relationships with other political 
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powers, but, importantly, these geopolitical attributes were changing rather than fixed. By 
contrast to Lattimore, he did not see geopolitics as a recipe for anti-imperial democratic 
global change, but as a necessary knowledge to strengthen American foreign policy in the 
existing imperial world order.  
 
3. Land, Sea and Air 
 
The Land/Sea dichotomy was a recurring theme in geopolitical writings on world 
order in the 1940s, and by consequence the foundation of the international thought of 
Spykman and Lattimore. In the first half of the twentieth century, Bowman, Mackinder, 
Mahan and Haushofer gave a political interpretation to these geographical concepts. 
Symbolically, the Land and Sea represent two out of the four classic natural elements of 
which the world is made: earth, water, air and fire. However, as the German jurist Carl 
Schmitt noted, political thinkers usually referred to Land and Sea as conflicting ‘powers’, not 
only as natural elements.39 They acquired a historical significance as methods for ordering 
and controlling the natural and human world, and subsequently gained a mythical meaning as 
the fundamental principles of entire civilizations. For Lattimore, the Land/Sea dichotomy 
described two inherently opposed transport technologies and two different means of 
bringing about political and economic order to a territory. These also implied two historical 
and political perspectives on a given territory: the oceanic and the continental gazes. As will 
be shown, Lattimore used this dichotomy to discuss the role of geography and political 
power in the transformation from imperial to democratic order. By contrast, Spykman saw 
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Land/Sea as two strategies for national defense, applicable to different geopolitical situations 
indicated by the state’s ‘place in the world’. As we shall see below, he used this dichotomy to 
reflect upon his two main geopolitical concepts, the Heartland and the Rimland. Both 
thinkers argued that the Land/Sea formula was destabilized – but not cancelled - by the 
increasing relevance of the ‘air’ element to political and cultural control over men and nature. 
Lattimore took as his starting point the assumption that the European and American 
imperial powers came across the sea to Asia and looked at the vast territory from boats and 
ports in the littoral zone: ‘our thinking about Asia stemmed from the great age of navigation 
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the old caravan routes were surpassed by 
new sea routes’.40 By contrast, he recognized the rise of local Asian powers that established 
their political centre in the land masses, looking outwards from the continental core towards 
the coasts. For Lattimore, the former form was repressive and exploitative; the latter was 
constructive and collaborative.41 The oceanic gaze, typical of the European empires, does not 
penetrate the local territory, and has no grasp of its unique cultural and political 
characteristics. According to Lattimore’s conception of knowledge, a superficial outlook 
cannot offer detailed information of Asia and its people. A political system based on 
ignorance cannot, therefore, be anything other than repressive. Yet, a territorial gaze allows a 
better understanding of local habits and structures. Nonetheless, it is important to note that 
a territorially based system of control was not, in itself, a guarantee against imperial 
repression and domination. The advantage it offered was merely a potential political 
interaction, which could lead to the creation of political space which measured itself with the 
local populations’ recognized political agency.  
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One of the questions that arise from Lattimore’s analysis of the Land/Sea dichotomy 
relates to the implications of these concepts to a general understanding of history. Did 
Lattimore see the Land/ Sea dichotomy as an empirical description of historical change, or 
as a normative criterion to understand power relations in the world? Rowe claims that his 
view of history was structured by technological determinism because its focus on the Land 
and Sea binary implied a vision of historical time as consisting of alternating epochs of 
maritime and territorial modes of transport technology. He accuses Lattimore of over 
emphasizing the importance of these technologies in forming systems of political control, 
and in describing the shift from one era to another as unavoidable.42 However, it is not so 
obvious that Lattimore regarded this dichotomy as a ‘general law’. Rather, he employed these 
concepts as a part of his anti-imperial discourse, offering a new key to local development 
that was independent of the European powers sea-based intervention. Lattimore’s 
interpretation of land and sea powers was not meant as a normative conceptualization of 
history, but as a political proposal to review power relations in the world, and especially in 
Asia, in order to give an opportunity to local land powers to oppose European imperialism. 
Therefore, the ‘land mass’ has an important prescriptive function, aimed at highlighting 
fundamental limitations in thinking about world politics from an external vantage-point. 
Lattimore uses the outsider position to argue that superficial knowledge and indirect political 
involvement have led to the no-longer-desirable imperial domination. The growing 
international influence of the United States could put it in a position to reverse this trend, 
and encourage local, direct systems of government.  
Lattimore’s geopolitics was part of his anti-imperial political project. For him a new 
interpretation of the political space would be necessary to bring about a postcolonial world 
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order based on freedom and democracy. He repositioned Mackinder’s notion of Heartland 
towards the East, undermining the importance of Europe, and argued against the British 
geographer that the Heartland did not imply conquest or imperial struggle. 43 His geopolitics 
sought to bring to attention areas of the globe which the Americans and Europeans saw as 
politically passive, and to give political agency to their populations.44 If, as Kearns argues, 
‘geopolitical vision is never innocent; it is always a wish posing as an analysis’, then 
Lattimore’s wish was to highlight the international potential of local political power in Asia. 45 
This approach was not shared by other American geopolitical thinker at the time – notably 
Bowman and Spykman – whose fundamental assumption was that the United States should 
seek to project its political values and interests on other parts of the world. Lattimore’s new 
Heartland was a political project aimed at reshaping the political space of Asia as a large and 
pluralistic region of democracy, freedom and popular participation. Since Lattimore 
published his writings in the United States, it is clear that he hoped to convince his 
readership to take a central role in this political transformation, without, nonetheless, 
imposing particular interests and values on the nascent democratic region. Lattimore 
promoted an interventionist position, aimed not at empowering the United States 
internationally, but at aiding the colonial regions to become ‘democratic’. 
The complex interaction between the Land/Sea elements was central to Spykman’s 
geopolitical thought. Yet he envisaged a constant struggle between maritime and continental 
powers struggling to balance their powers and achieve peaceful temporary equilibrium. He 
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further complicated his thesis by adding two new concepts to the world map: Rimland and 
Encirclement.46 The Rimland is the littoral areas of Europe and Asia, stretching from the 
North Sea to the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. This is the 
world’s area of greatest economic, political and demographic development. He located in the 
Rimland the conceptual and geographical meeting point of the sea and land powers, a 
‘frontier zone’ of political struggle and innovation. Modifying Mackinder’s dictum on the 
Heartland, the political power which controlled the Rimland would dominate the entire 
world. Spykman argued that the Rimland was an independent political zone separated by 
lack of communication and transport technologies from Mackinder’s Heartland, and 
conceptually contrasted to it. Yet he overlooked the impact of technological advances, 
including air power, on the Rimland/Heartland relations. Interestingly, all of the ‘great 
powers’ that Spykman identified, including the United States, Britain, Russia, Germany and 
Japan, were positioned outside the Rimland, but projected their power onto it. 47 Geopolitical 
conditions made of the Rimland a ‘buffer zone’, a frontier area between the Sea and Land 
powers, rather than an area of independent power. This point seems to be the main 
difference between the Rimland and Lattimore’s frontier zone. In other words, whereas for 
Lattimore the frontier population was endowed with political agency, the Rimland 
population was instrumental to the great powers’ geopolitical balance of power and lacked 
own decision-making power. Evidently, Spykman perpetuated an imperial view of world 
order, in which hegemonic power acquired direct or indirect control of areas of strategic 
interest, largely in disregard of local communities.   
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In the 1940s, the cartographic imagery of the world underwent significant change: 
new projections aimed at representing the world from different, previously ignored, 
geographic viewpoints to important political consequences.48 For Spykman, cartographic 
imagery plays a central role in understanding the political world through the concept of 
‘Encirclement’: if the Old World is placed at the centre of the map, as in the traditional 
Mercator projection, it is ‘encircled’ by the American coasts. If, on the other hand, the map 
is centered on the New World, following the Miller projection as he suggested, the Old 
World’s Eurasian coasts could ‘encircle’ it. In his eyes, the active position of the embracing 
power is better than the passive ‘encircled’: the new cartographic projection served to alert 
the Americans to their possible ‘encirclement’ by hostile powers. For Spykman the 
geopolitical position of the United States  - facing three oceans, the Atlantic, the Pacific and 
the Arctic, and spreading its influence over its two ‘extensions’ (Canada and Latin America) - 
endowed it with a special global leadership role. Thus, the United States was ‘the most 
important political unit in the “New World”’, and should create the postwar world order 
according to its own notion of ‘balance of power’. 49 If Spykman’s geopolitics was aimed at 
promoting American interventionist foreign policy the notion of Encirclement pushed the 
intervention even further. It extended the original Monroe Doctrine to a ‘total hemispheric 
defence’, underlining the United States’ role as maritime and territorial power leading a 
region covering more than half the globe.50  
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The traditional geopolitical discourse of the Land/Sea dichotomy was destabilized in 
the 1940s by the diffusion of air power for military warfare and civil transport.51 The 
growing popularity of and interest in air power gave new impetus to a reconsideration of 
earlier geopolitical theories. Many thought the ‘traditional’ Land/Sea dichotomy would be 
broken by air power which would revolutionize the geopolitical perspective of the world.52 
Even Mackinder sought to adjust his Heartland theory to a new conceptual view of the earth 
that emerged from the human experience of flight.53 Interestingly, while Lattimore and 
Spykman recognized the revolutionary potential of air power, they did not think flight could 
have decisive impact on their theories of world order. Rather than revolutionizing the 
geopolitical conception of the world, air power reinforced existing spatial categories and 
conceptions. In the 1940s air travel was celebrated for its technological achievements, and 
the new bird’s-eye view of the earth it offered.54 Wendell Willkie, the ex-presidential 
candidate, published in 1942 his best-seller One World, an account of his airplane tour around 
the world and his vision of the world as ‘one’, an indivisible unit whose inhabitants shared a 
common humanity which would overcome any political divide.55 For Lattimore, the aerial 
representations of the Earth highlighted its natural unity, but obfuscated the nuances of 
human social existence, giving an illusion of geographic spaces empty of political attributes. 
The world’s territories become pawns in a strategic game, rather than proactive, autonomous 
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political units. The limits of the aerial viewpoint highlighted the political importance of what 
happened on the ground. 56 
The emergence of air power is discussed in Lattimore’s essay in A Compass of the 
World in 1946.57 Air power created a new map of the world, in which lines of longitude and 
latitude were more significant than national territorial borders. The new air technology 
rendered the Arctic an increasingly important area when flight over the Polar Region 
replaced the risky air routes over the Pacific Ocean. Yet for Lattimore the importance of air 
power lay not in the technological achievement, but in its political implications. Air 
technology was a revolution in potentia rather than in practice, until it impacted the world’s 
political structure as a whole. Thus, if only a few Western powers had access to air 
technology, the imperial world order would not be abolished. A real turning point could be 
the acquisition of air power by the Asian region, where it could open up landlocked 
countries to other regions of the world, and facilitate their development as independent 
political powers. Therefore, Lattimore saw air power not as a defining element of a new ‘air 
age’, but as a transitory technology which would shift the world’s geopolitical balance from 
empire to democracy. Technology was to be reinforced by shared consciousness to the 
political limits of imperial control.58 Thus, not only was Lattimore not a technological 
determinist, he was well aware of the crucial role of politics in defining the meaning of 
technological innovation.  
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The problem was one of perception as much as technological might. Air technology, 
and the spatial imaginary of the aerial gaze, exacerbated for Lattimore the pathologies of 
imperialism, already present in the ‘gun-boat’ era. Imperialism implied not only specific 
political practices, but an all-encompassing world order which created a common 
imagination exemplified in colonial mental maps. Europe, and for that matter the United 
States as well, observed Asia from boats and airplanes as one massive territory, inhibited by 
hostile yet indistinguishable tribes and ‘races’. This infinite land was ‘empty’ of politics 
because from the shore, or from the air, the foreign rulers could not identify the continent’s 
complex political structures. They presumed its population lacked interest in establishing a 
system of political control, or in participating in politics in the same manner that an educated 
European or American citizen would. Lattimore advanced an epistemic critique of Willkie’s 
account, which emphasized shared and universal human values. He highlighted the 
importance of direct, detailed knowledge of the different modes of social organization and 
political interaction in local Asian societies, to formulating political thought. This form of 
knowledge was available only to those who travel and explore the Asian land masses.  
Lattimore thus differed significantly from those who announced the coming of the 
Air Age. In denouncing the potential of air power to carry on the obsolete practices of 
empire, Lattimore implicitly criticized the wide-spread American conception of air power. 
Influential figures like Clare Boothe Luce, a pioneering air traveler, Republican politician and 
the wife of publisher Henry Luce, construed air power as a means to extend American 
influence around the world without resorting to actual imperial conquest. Air power could 
complement sea power to guarantee American interests world-wide, since there were ‘no 
more distant places’.59 As Van Vleck notes, this was not a new approach: since the 1920s air 
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power was seen as a way to facilitate imperial control of the colonial periphery. Some 
wartime commentators went as far as calling America an ‘aerial empire’. ‘Empire of the air’ 
slowly became a catchphrase in the popular imagination of America’s global role; this was 
the precise idea that Lattimore hoped to eradicate.  
Spykman was even more doubtful of the political importance of air power as an 
independent, politically relevant technology. He thought air power was ineffective in 
connecting the Rimland to the land mass. He accepted that warfare had become ‘truly tri-
dimensional’ but did not think that air power could be more than an auxiliary of land and sea 
powers. Air technology could be politically revolutionary if it could overcome the natural 
barriers which previously hampered transportation and communication and condemned 
some regions to political isolation.60 In 1944 he refuted the claims promoted by Lattimore 
and geographer Vilhjalmur Stehansson that air power could, under certain conditions, 
radically change world politics. He did not think that warfare and political control could be 
based on air power alone. 61 Nevertheless it is surprising that Spykman ignored the potential 
capacity of air power to easily connect the Rimland and the Heartland, which he considered 
technologically and politically detached. A closer Rimland/Heartland relationship would 
have rendered sea-based political control irrelevant and undermined the independence of the 
littoral zones, challenging much of Spykman’s strategy.62 In 1944 technical limitations, like 
the need for fueling stations and landing bases encouraged Spykman to overlook the 
destabilizing potential of air power in the framework of his tripolar strategy.  
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The air power brings to the fore the disagreement between Lattimore and Spykman 
on the issue of empire. Since the war emphasized the decline of the European empires, a 
new world order would have to take into account the transition towards decolonization in 
Asia and Africa. Lattimore’s geopolitics emerged as a critique of empire, proposing a more 
collaborative scheme of interstate relations to eschew the mentality of imperial power 
politics. By contrast, Spykman sought to replace the European empires with American 
power, and argued that America’s military bases in the Pacific were essential to prevent the 
ascendancy of Russia and China, the two new rising powers of the 1940s. Lattimore 
discarded Spykman’s ideas as an old-fashioned approach:  
an inability to get away from the obsessions of the past hundred years. [..] for the last 
one hundred years, an enormously important area of the world, the Asiatic half of 
what the German geopoliticians call the "Eurasiatic land mass", the greatest 
continuous mass of land on the earth’s surface, has been dominated, partly for 
geographical reasons and partly for technological reasons, by the nations which had 
sea power.63  
For Lattimore the new land-based world order meant that the imperial age of the “gun-boat” 
was over and consequently the coastal frontier would be replaced by the land frontier 
between Russia and China. Spykman on the other hand argued that the coastal areas, in his 
words the 'Rimland', would maintain prime importance as a frontier area, and remain a 
central part of sea and land based strategic defense. This difference had important impact on 
their global strategy. For Lattimore, once imperialism was eclipsed, ‘the things that will 
happen along [the Russia-China] land frontier, far beyond the reach of any American 
gunboat or battleship, or airplane carrier or air base specified by the most ambitious 
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American Centuryite, are of greater significance than anything that will happen in the Pacific 
Ocean.’64 However, for Spykman, a geopolitical vision which focused on either Land 
supremacy or Sea domination was unbalanced because the real focal point of international 
politics was in the area of their encounter. The Rimland became hub for imperial interaction, 
and the focal point of American foreign policy. 
 
4. The Geopolitics of Scale 
 
Geography and technology influenced the conception of space in yet another way: by 
making political thinkers reconsider the notion of ‘power’ through the geopolitical concept 
of ‘scale’. Considerations of ‘scale’, in particularly regarding the desirable size of states, were 
part of international thought since the late 19th century.65 Nonetheless, wartime thinkers 
argued that a reflection on ‘scale’ was necessary because technological innovations changed 
the relations between time and space, potentially influencing the ‘balance of power’ in the 
world. For Spykman ‘all civilized life rests in the last instance on power’, which he defined as 
the ‘the ability to move men’. Politics was concerned with increasing the state’s power, and 
not with ‘justice, fairness and tolerance.’ He recognized that political power could a means to 
an ethical end, but simultaneously tried to divorce the notion of political international 
‘power’ from ‘morality’, which was for him a ‘world of dreams’. 66 Yet for Spykman ‘power’ 
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should not be discussed in moral but in geopolitical terms. Both he and Lattimore agreed 
that ‘the ability to move man’ could be exercised better in large scale political spaces, arguing 
that small states could not resist the pressure from their stronger neighbors and would have 
to integrate into the larger polity, voluntarily or not:67  
a world order that is both progressive and stable must include the concept of large 
Asiatic states, each of which is politically free and each of which has its political and 
economic system centered in the heart of its own territory, reaching out from the 
centre to defend and control the land frontiers and the coasts and ports.’68  
Warning against a repetition of the unsuccessful post-war settlement of 1919, Lattimore and 
Spykman argued that small states were politically undesirable. They undermined the principle 
of national self-determination for the sake of international peaceful political equilibrium. 
Their attitude shows that by the time the United States engaged in global war the Wilsonian 
ethos of national self-determination was not the main concern in the eyes of the American 
public and policymakers.69 In the air age, Spykman argued, only large states could be 
powerful enough to sustain air, sea and land-based warfare.70 Smaller states without the 
demographic, geopolitical and natural resources to wage tri-dimensional war could only exist 
as ‘buffer states’ under the protection of larger states, in a system based on the principle of 
'balance of power': ‘[t]he existence of a buffer state is an indication of a system of 
approximately balanced forces.’71 In 1941 he discussed the international implications of his 
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interpretation of power: the international sphere was characterized by a struggle for power, 
and each state aimed to protect its independence and the integrity of its territory.72 The 
struggle for power was for him a continuous historical phenomenon resulting from the 
impossibility of attaining absolute ‘order’ or ‘anarchy’ in the intrinsically dynamic and 
changeable international sphere.73 The authority of a political power was circumscribed to a 
physical territory, but could also be ‘projected’ beyond the state’s borders to pursue its 
foreign policy goals of political independence and territorial integrity.74 Spykman found a 
solution in geopolitics: collective security could be effective only if the members of the 
international society were all approximately of equal strength. ‘Map makers of the postwar 
world should try to avoid as much as possible great inequality in power potential’.75  
Evidently both Spykman and Lattimore proclaimed a regional world order, yet 
Spykman’s was more in line with American priorities at the time, and resonated to a certain 
extent with the regional plan proposed by the Assistant Secretary of State for American 
Republic Affairs Nelson Rockefeller at the Dumbarton Oaks conference in 1944. At the 
Georgetown conference, two American visions for world order emerged: a system of 
regional blocs promoted by Rockefeller, and a universal institutional vision advanced by to 
Brookings Institution’s Leo Pasvolsky.76 Eventually, Pasvolsky’s proposal prevailed, and the 
United Nations Organization was founded on universal not regional principles. Yet the 
debate between Rockefeller and Pasvolsky reflects a wider American debate on postwar 
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order to which Spykman contributed. While Rockefeller’s global vision was based on 
regional alliances and cooperation pacts, Spykman’s unabashedly focused on extending 
American power in its geopolitical region, which would for him overlap with the whole 
Western hemisphere.77 Spykman used frontiers to parcel the world into states and regions of 
equal powers, because ‘the frontier determines the power potential of the territory it 
surrounds.’ How could this be done? How could ‘power’ be evaluated and measured in order 
to parcel territories equally? America's Strategy presents quantitative research in politics, based 
on empirical data and statistics, to evaluate the power potentials of a given territory, and thus 
formulate political strategy on the basis of calculable parameters like geography, climate, 
resources and demography. However, since these factors were not static or equally 
distributed, an artificial territorial division would be desirable but impractical. A solution 
could only be found if the political scientist and the geographer joined forces to formulate 
‘legal provisions for sanctions that harmonize with the distribution of power’.78 His 
conclusion, giving the final word in international affairs to politicians, rejected interwar 
legalistic internationalism which grounded collective security in international institutions 
such as the League of Nations, where legal solutions were prioritized over political ones.79 
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Spykman called for a return to a political world order overtly based on the existing regional 
balance of power.  
The ‘balance of power’ is, according to Richard Little, an ambiguous metaphor 
transformed into a myth which describes, or distorts, international politics.80 Little suggests 
that it helps us to think of the notion of ‘power’ through the concept of ‘balance’. The 
mental image that accompanies the traditional version of the 'balance of power' metaphor is 
the weighing scale. Yet Spykman offered an alternative image grounded in geopolitics. He 
used this metaphor to create an imaginary space of politics that is not defined by the image 
of a scale, but by a geopolitical map which translated ‘power’ into territorial terms. An 
international redistribution of power could be achieved, at least theoretically, by parceling 
the world’s territory into units of equal power. ‘Balance of power’ operated through 
geopolitical methods like boundary-making, alliances, spheres of influence, compensation, 
and war. The territorial metaphor of equilibrium outlined on a new cartographic projection 
of the world and highlighted the close relations between the political and the geographic 
dimensions of the state. Spykman unfolded political relations in terms of territoriality and 
spatial control; by using metaphorical and visual instruments he was able to put forward a 
new conception of tripolarity as the basis for international politics.  
 
5. The Frontier in international relations 
 
The spatial concept of the ‘frontier’ played a pivotal role in the political imagination of 
Spykman and Lattimore. Bearing a geographic, symbolic and political meaning, it became the 
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political space created by the territorial division and encounter of two different political and 
social entities. Importantly, each of the thinkers used the geopolitical frontier to justify a 
different political goal: for Lattimore anti-imperialism and for Spykman American 
interventionism. The frontier theory remains Lattimore’s most recognized contributions to 
historical and anthropological scholarship, although its strategic or political importance is 
now lost.81 The frontier, an area rather than a line, gives order to the entire political system.82 
The frontier is not a demarcating outline of the political unit, but a physical, conceptual and 
political zone of struggle and interaction, of both local and international importance. Since 
Lattimore thought that socio-political ideas and norms penetrated the territory from its 
frontiers towards the centre, the frontier population became the political vanguard for the 
entire political unit.83 In the American imagination, the ‘frontier’ was mostly tied with the 
thesis advanced by the historian Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893.84 This thesis was 
fundamentally important for creating the myth of American democracy: for Turner the 
‘moving frontier line’ was the practical and political reason for the development of the 
American conception of liberty, as distinct from the European political traditions. Free from 
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binding social and economic relations, the frontier land was free to be taken by the 
American pioneers. Turner’s influential writings paved the way for a long-term American 
interest in the frontier as geopolitical myth: even Lattimore’s friend, Vice-President Henry 
Wallace, published his version of the ‘frontier thesis’.85 Yet for Lattimore Turner’s frontier 
was as a symbol of expansion and conquest: after all, the American continent was not an 
empty space, and it should not be forgotten that its native peoples lost their life and territory 
in the encounter with the pioneers.86 Conceptually, whereas for Turner at the end of the 
westbound expansion process the geographic frontier disappeared into the Pacific Ocean 
and lost its geopolitical importance, for Lattimore the frontier would remain a defining 
political factor because it depended not only on geography, but also on the society and the 
state which construed it. Lattimore argued that Turner’s thesis was limited by its focus on 
the frontier as the zone of geographic encounter between the European immigrant and the 
American wilderness. Instead, he suggested a more holistic, structural view taking into 
account the institutional and cultural factors which characterized and motivated the social 
exchange in the frontier zone. For him, each society required and perpetuated the concept of 
‘frontier’, and the necessary ‘other’ on its opposite side, to define its own identity.  
The political space of the frontier is better illustrated, for Lattimore, by the vast 
Asian land frontier, stretching from Turkey to Korea. Unlike the American frontier, this was 
a geographic space of cultural interaction and a hub of national movements. James Scott’s 
reading of Lattimore emphasizes the contention between the agricultural plane and the 
pastoral hills populations, and the fundamental importance of the relations between the 
human and the natural in creating the political sphere. Lattimore saw the nomadic social 
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order, which escaped the control of the territorial state, as a complex developed social 
system, unlike most interpreters who conceived the transition from agriculture to nomadism 
as social deterioration. The populations of the frontier zone, like the Mongols, Uzbeks and – 
in Scott’s research – the Zomia highlanders, created a pluralistic, unstable and amorphous 
political space that was characterized by ‘low-stateness’. Lattimore and Scott alike saw this 
unique political reality as a counterbalance to the western conception of the state as a 
territorially-fixed entity. It allowed a more flexible and versatile interpretation of the 
territorial space of political action and participation.87 For Lattimore this entailed an 
interpretation of liberty based on a versatile, nomadic political space, which Scott later 
elaborated into a complex theory of nomadic anarchism. Lattimore, unlike Scott, did not 
necessarily consider the peoples of the inner Asian hills as promoters of an anarchical 
interpretation of politics, but he did think flexible nomadic system was endowed with greater 
freedom than the fixed territorial state. Thus, the nomadic populations of the frontier zone 
could decide whether to ‘descend’ to the agricultural planes and participate in the territorial 
political community, or maintain their pastoral liberty. The hill peoples were not anarchic but 
promoters of a different kind of order, characterized by pluralism and instability.  
Spykman offered a different interpretation of the ‘frontier’ in world order. In a 
speech given at the joint session of the Association of American Geographers and the 
American Political Science Association on 31 December 1941, he argued that the Americans 
would be given the task of formulating a postwar ‘new world order’ based on the ‘usual 
components’ of world politics: boundaries, territorial security and international organization. 
In this speech, delivered weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Spykman outlined his 
spatial vision of postwar order, and the role of the United States in it. He rebuffed as out-
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dated the legalistic universalistic notions of ‘order’, which sought to construct a universal 
juridical framework applicable worldwide. Political power would continue to reside in 
territorial states whose dynamic struggle for power would outlive the war. By consequence, 
war and conflict could not be avoided, only limited.  
In these circumstances, his geopolitical theory evolved from what he considered to 
be the state’s most important feature: its territoriality. The state’s territoriality gives prime 
importance to the ‘imaginary line’ of the ‘boundary’, which is ‘not only a line of demarcation 
between legal systems but also a point of contact for territorial power structures. From the 
long term point of view, the location of that line may indicate the power relations of the 
contending forces.88 Thus, for Spykman the frontier theory was an opportunity to discuss 
power relations: frontiers are used to delimit a state’s power potential.89 The cultural, ethnic 
or economic importance of the frontier areas is completely absent from this account that 
regards frontiers as one of the instruments available to the sovereign state to control flows 
of people and goods into and from its territory.  
The Rimland was also an extended frontier zone, the dividing area between the Sea 
and the Land powers, a geopolitical mega-frontier that complemented the importance of the 
political frontiers between states. In order to achieve a powerful position in the world, the 
United States would have to ‘project’ its political influence on the Rimland. Spykman 
extended the Monroe Doctrine, which defined American foreign policy in its sphere of 
interests, to the entire Western hemisphere. The impact of contending powers could be 
limited, and the United States could potentially become a leading international not regional 
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power.90 This idea was supported also by the interpretation of the Rimland as a frontier zone 
between the United States and its rivals, especially Soviet Russia, the British Empire and 
Japan. For Spykman, the extension of the American frontier beyond the oceans, to Asia and 
Europe, created a new foreign policy based on active intervention, serving his political goal 
of ending American isolationism.   
In contrast to Lattimore’s frontier, which constructed a zone of interaction, 
Spykman’s strategic and divisive frontier created new impetus for potentially imperial 
intervention in the name of regional defence. The revival and extension of the Monroe 
Doctrine, that became increasingly popular in American political thought at the time, was 
not shared by Lattimore. For him, this was the emblem of the negative and destructive 
aspects of the imperial order: the paradoxical combination of self-interested intervention in 
the colonial world, and international policy of isolationism embodied the worst of American 
foreign policy. As we will now see, this pattern in foreign policy was exactly what his vision 




It is a truism to note that the position of the United States in the Western 
Hemisphere conditions American foreign policy, and more generally the American outlook 
on world politics. Yet for Spykman, unlike many of his contemporaries, this geopolitical 
factor had a specific ideological implication: it revised and reinterpreted the American 
Monroe Doctrine, directing policymakers away from isolationism towards a politics of 
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intervention in world affairs. Isolationism was a common (but contested) political position in 
the United States since the First World War.91 Both Spykman and Lattimore sought to 
reverse this trend, each for his own reason. Their solution was to outline a tripolar world 
order, in which the New World was seen as one power region in the world, the ‘Western 
Hemisphere’, while the Old World constituted two power regions: Europe and the Asia. In 
each region there can be only one great power which sets the terms of the political game. 
Interestingly, Lattimore shared Spykman’s commitment to the tripolar thesis with the United 
States and the USSR as two power poles, but there was no agreement on the third 
component: a democratic Asia for Lattimore, or British-led Europe for Spykman. If the 
struggle between ‘democracy’ and ‘empire’ was already hinted in the prewar world, the war 
exacerbated the divisive tendencies. The growing American skepticism of Britain and 
France’s ability to uphold their empire after the war was interpreted very differently by 
Lattimore and Spykman: the first enthusiastically announced the end of the imperial order, 
while the latter invited the United States to take the place of the European empires in 
defence of Western civilization.92 Thus, they offered two very different conclusions to the 
geopolitical approach to postwar world order.  
Innovations in cartography are essential to understand how tripolarity was embedded 
in Lattimore’s and Spykman’s assumptions about political space. In the 1940s new world 
maps, based on innovative projections, became available and helped them articulate their 
visions in geopolitical terms. Spykman suggested that the idea of political tripolarity could 
                                                 
91
 John Thompson, ‘The geopolitical vision: the myth of an outmatched U.S.A.’ in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, Uncertain 
Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War (Oxford, 2012). 
92
 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010 
(Cambridge, 2012), 154–160. 
 36 
only be understood by looking at a specific kind of maps. America’s Strategy included color 
maps by the famous American cartographer Richard Edes Harrison, with detailed 
explanations of the advantages of the projections used to illustrating political changes in the 
world. The Miller and Gall projections – rather than the previously dominant Mercator 
projection - offered a distortion-free perception of the world illustrating the strategic 
implications of geopolitical changes.93 Lattimore also included maps of central Asia in his 
books as an immediate representation of the political relevance of the ‘great frontier’. The 
novelty of their visions was not necessarily rooted in new physical geographic realities. 
Rather, it was a combination of political ideas on empire, new transport and communication 
technologies, and innovative cartographic representations that created their tripolar 
geopolitical spaces. Cosgrove suggests that in the 1940s new cartographic publications 
manifested the growing importance of spatial representations in shaping the new global role 
of the United States.94 Similarly, Spykman and Lattimore thought that their spatial 
conceptions, emerging from new representations of the observable empiric world, implied 
implicit normative claim that American isolationism was no longer viable. It is telling that 
despite their different assumptions on political agency, both argued that interventionism was 
the only strategy which could carve an adequate postwar space for the United States: as a 
new kind of imperial power for Spykman, or as an anti-imperial liberator for Lattimore.  
Why did Spykman and Lattimore promote a tripolar world order? In the same years 
the tripolar vision could have seem a natural outcome of the victorious war alliance. Others, 
like the French philosopher Raymond Aron and the British writer George Orwell also 
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envisaged a world divided into three regions.95 By 1977 the ‘tripolarity’ school of thought, 
centered on Russia, the United States and China, has been recognized and discussed by 
political scientists as a viable if complicated political alternative to bipolarity.96 However, 
these ideas of tripolarity lack the conceptual geopolitical background Lattimore and 
Spykman offered. For them, tripolar order could reflect the postwar geopolitical reality 
(which Spykman did not see as he died in 1943), but could also guarantee a degree of 
regional diversity which a universal legal solution would undermine. In 1941, Spykman 
thought the postwar world would not differ substantially from the prewar world:  a world of 
sovereign states struggling to maintain their territorial integrity and political independence. 
Yet these states would no longer be united in a legal international order governed by a world 
organization like the League of Nations. They would be politically organized in three great 
regions of roughly the same geopolitical ‘power’, each led by one, preferably democratic, 
hegemonic power.97 Lattimore’s proposal was geopolitically similar but substantially 
different: he hoped the Asian ‘Third World’ could put an end to Soviet-American 
antagonism, as well as to imperial domination, by offering a political and economic 
alternative ‘middle way’. What they did have in common was a call for American 
intervention in world affairs, which was nonetheless motivated by conflicting views of the 
global legitimacy of imperialism. 
Lattimore’s critique of imperialism pushed him to envisage Asia as a source of 
democratic political power in the postwar world. He pointed to a free and democratic China 
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as a future regional leader, alongside Russia and the Untied States. ‘I think China is still 
perhaps the most important single area. There have been people who have spoken of the 
years to come after the war as the “American Century”. Perhaps it is more likely that the 
next hundred years will be the Chinese Century.’98 Although such a statement would not 
seem out of place today, in the 1940s the major public debate revolved around the idea of an 
‘American Century’, announced by Henry Luce in an influential article in Life, just two years 
before Lattimore proclaimed the ‘Chinese Century’.99 Luce argued, not unlike Spykman, that 
the American Century ended the United States’ isolation, and marked its entrance into world 
politics as a leading power. It was the beginning of a new age not only in American history, 
but in the history of the world as a whole.100  
Lattimore hoped that China’s rising to global importance would mark the end of 
imperialism as the defining category of political space. The Chinese leadership depended not 
only on factors of power, but also on a moral claim: China would offer a new model for 
freedom and democracy. The idea of the ‘Chinese Century’ celebrated potentially democratic 
China as a new partner in a democratic world politics, the leader of the ‘Third World’, 
against European and American imperial tendencies.101 The ‘Third World’, a term which 
Lattimore first used in 1948, was not only a vanguard plan for regional democracy, but also 
an experimental playground for a compromise between the American and the Russian 
models, especially in economics. The local Asian traditions and cultures would develop an 
autochthonous version of democracy as a midway between capitalism and collectivism, to 
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defeat the American-Soviet binary. Thus, the ‘Chinese Century’ announced the emergence of 
a new political age, but also of a new economic system, which differed from imperial 
traditions by expunging exploitation and inequality. This ‘Third World’ economic system, 
interestingly, shared some basic assumptions with early theories of the welfare state, since for 
Lattimore a semi-regulated free-market state would not ‘protect profits at the expense of 
human rights’.102 
 
Conclusion: Geopolitics and the postwar political space 
In 1942, Kurt R. Mattusch of the American State Department criticized the nascent 
American geopolitical thought in an article in the left-leaning journal Amerasia.103 Mattusch 
argued that ‘in a global war, space has a new meaning’, and that new spatial reality meant a 
new universalism, based on Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and on economic cooperation. 
Despite the superficiality of his criticism he grasped a grain of truth: in the postwar study of 
international relations in the United States, political ideologies and abstract economic 
theories gained prominence. The interest in geopolitics was in decline.  
The global visions of Lattimore and Spykman used the spatial terminology of 
geopolitics to conceptualize potential postwar political innovations. Both promoted regional 
– rather than universal – solutions, and justified them in geopolitical terms. Lattimore’s 
tripolar order replaced empire with democracy as the founding principle of international 
relations, emphasizing the importance of self rule, popular participation and political liberty 
as the foundation of democratic order. Spykman was less concerned with democracy than 
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with global hegemony, and he sought to refashion the US as a world political leader 
implicitly building upon the existing experience of empire while delegitimizing it outwardly. 
Both thought that decolonization in Asia gave impetus to their visions, rendering them 
timely, relevant and desirable. 
However, by 1950 their ideas became marginalized within American discourse on 
foreign policy and the nascent discipline of IR. Spykman is still sometimes described as one 
of the earliest ‘realist’ thinkers (though the term remains vague and contested) and is credited 
for inspiring his Yale colleagues Dunn and Wolfers, who played a pivotal role in shaping the 
American IR discipline.104 Lattimore’s scholarship is rarely associated today with 
international relations, politics or strategic studies. In way of conclusion, I will briefly outline 
five reasons for the limited impact of their political visions, and possibly of geopolitics in 
general, on IR scholarship. The first evident cause is personal: Spykman died in 1943 and 
Lattimore was ostracized from academia and the public sphere when Sen. Joseph McCarthy 
prosecuted him for Anti-Americanism.105 The second factor is the atomic revolution. In 
1945, after the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, the perception of political space 
changed radically: time and space became irrelevant.106 It was the nuclear bomb, and not air 
power, that rendered the world truly ‘one’, as Wendell Willkie wanted it. The nuclear 
revolution resulted in the rise of universalism over regionalism as the key principle for a new 
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global order, and dictated also the kind of postwar international organizations that the Allied 
powers saw as desirable. The third reason is embodied in the emergence of the Cold War 
ideology, mentality and foreign policy, especially after the Korea War and the Chinese Civil 
War. Although the extent and impact of the Cold War could not have been foreseen by the 
geopolitical thinkers in the early 1940s, their spatial visions were definitely compromised by 
the rise of bipolarity. Consequently, a fourth reason is the renewed emphasis on political 
ideology and abstract economic theories that undermined the importance of territoriality and 
geography. The foundation of the United Nations Organization, the Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the establishment of international economic institutions contributed to 
reinforcing the universalist view of world politics over the regional one. The fifth reason 
was, paradoxically, the decolonization trend that strengthened the centrality of the state. 
Despite Lattimore’s supportive attention to Asian anti-colonial movements, he did not 
foresee their insistence on the political structure of the state as vehicle of political freedom, 
and overemphasized the liberating capacities of a supranational world order. Lattimore and 
Spykman envisaged regional political space that ignored the two defining spatial ideas of the 
postwar era: the universalism of economics and ideologies, and the particular space of the 
state. As a consequence, their world order visions lost political relevance, and was excluded 
of from the scholarship and mainstream historiography of international relations in the 
United States.  
